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SUMMARY: Whether, consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, a state court may limit to prospective declaratory 
and mandamus relief the remedies available to a landowner whose 
land becomes subject to a zoning ordinance that deprives it of 
value to an extent that would constitute a taking if the zoning 
restrictions persevered, and may preclude damages suits brought 
under a theory of inverse condemnation. 
FACTS: Appellants own five choice acres of undeveloped 
"ridgelands" overlooking San Francisco Bay that are located 
within the city of Tiburon -- pop. 6,209; total area 1,676 
\ ~) 
- - 2 - -
acres. In June of 1973 the city passed zoning ~ inan~es 
--- creating an "RPD-1" zoning classification and classifying 
appellants' and other parcels of land in this category. The 
RPD-1 classification permits use of the land for (1) one family 
dwellings; (2) open space uses; and (3) ~ccessory buildings and 
accessory use. Density is limited to not less than .2 nor more 
than 1 dwelling unit per gross acre. 
/ Appellants made no application 
l property following adoption of the 
to use or improve their 
ordinances. Instead, they 
fi l ed an dministrative claim against the city in Oct. 1973 
seeking $2 mil. for the taking of the land. The city rejected 
the claim in Nov. 1973. 
In Dec. 1973, the city acted under its eminent domain 
~
,....4t authority pursuant to its comprehensive development plan and 
.__,,,, ~~d suit to conde~ ppellants~ nd. However, in Nov. 1974 
· the city withdrew the suit, content to rely upon the RPD-1 
~ - ----
zoning classification to preserve the beneficial qualities of 
the property for the community. After withdrawl of the suit, 
the city paid appellants $4,500 pursuant to statute for 
appellants' necessary expenses incurred during the pendency of 
the action, which sum did not include damages for · financial 
impairment during pendency of the eminent domain action of the 
owner's right to sell. 
In June 1975, appellants filed a complaint in county court 
alleging (1) a claim sounding in inverse condemnation that the 
city's actions had constituted a taking for which judgment for 
- just compensation should be granted, and (2) a claim for 
declaratory relief that the offensive ordinances were invalid 
\ 
because they were confiscatory and in excess of the c i ty's 
~-
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authority. The city demurred to the complaint and the court 
dismissed both causes of action. The Cal. Ct. of Appeals 
reversed the dismissal on the inverse condemnation cause of 
action, but affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for 
declaratory judgment. 
HOLDING BELOW: The Cal. S.Ct. ruled that a landowner 
------__. - - -, 
aggrieved by a zoning ordinance that substantially limits use 
of his property may challenge both the constitutionality of the 
ordinance and the manner in which it is applied to his property 
by seeking to establish the invalidity of the ordinance either 
through the remedy of declaratory relief or mandamus, but he 
may not recover damages on the theory of inverse condemnation. 
~ - -- --
The Ct. acknowledged the "clear, direct, and unquestionable 
constitutional basis for the protection of private property" 
- found in the Fifth Amendment and in the state constitution. 
·-
These provisions placed substantive limitations on the exercise 
of the police power but did not require that a remedy be 
provided which would "transmute an excessive use of the police 
power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent 
domain must be paid." It was a sufficient remedy to allow 
mandamus and declaratory relief to invalidate excessive zoning - ----------ordinances. 
-=---------
The Court saw the availability of an inverse condemnation 
remedy as a threat to legislative control over appropriate 
land-use determinations, which took the weighing of costs and 
benefits out of legislative hands and placed control of the 
expenditure of public funds in the hands of the judiciary. 
Quoting one commentator: 
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compensation is an appropriate function of the judiciary, 
whose function includes protection of individuals against 
t 
excesses of government. But it seems a usurpation of 
legislative power for a court to force compensation. 
Invalidation, rath er than forced comp ensation, would seem 
to be the more expedT ent means of remedying legislative 
excesses." 
Since the inverse condemnation remedy was not available, 
the S.Ct. dismissed the complaint as to that cause of action. 
Turning to the facts of this case to determine if declaratory 
relief was appropriate, the Ct. found no excessive use of the 
zoning power. The Ct. ruled that a "zoning ordinance may be 
unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only when its 
effect is to deprive the landowner of substantially all 
reasonable use of his property." Applying this test, the 
limitation of development by the challenged ordinance to one 
family unit per acre did not constitute a taking violative of 
the federal or state constitutions. 
The dissenting Justice relied on both state and federal 
constitutional grounds. Under the state constitution, "private 
property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just 
compensation ..• has first been paid to ... the owner." 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 19. The dissent found the injury here 
to constitute "damage" to the property within the meaning of 
the state constitution. The dissent also asserted that 
application of federal S.Ct. precedent would find a taking in 
the circumstances of the case. 
CONTENTIONS: Appellants paint a bleak picture, informing 
the Court that in the area of inverse condemnation "there is 
abroad an ~ ellectual vacuum of principle. This Court has 
entertained cases of this type so infrequently, and disposed of 
\ 
them with such paucity of doctrinal principle applicable to 
~ 
- - 5 - -
diverse factual situations, as to provide the lower courts 
~- around the country with precious little reliable precedential 
guidance." Appellants invite the Court to fill the vacuum, 
arguing that "there comes a point where even bad law is better 




.... _ .. ,, 
....... 
disputes ..•. " There is no indication what approach 
appellants recommend, other than the ad hoc methodology 
employed to date. 
On the question of the choice of remedies available for 
unconstitutional takings, appellants point out the conflict 
among the state courts as to the correct solution. Appellant 
also cite to a conflict between the Cal. rule in this case and 
Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963), Dugan v. Rank, 372 
U.S. 609 (1963), and Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932), 
which held that inverse condemnation damages, not invalidation 
or injunction constitute the remedy for Fifth Amendment 
violations of this type. Other instances are cited where this 
Court refused to invalidate legislation based on the claim that 
it effected an unconstitutional taking but rather found it 
consistent with legislative intent to remit the plaintiff to 
his money damages remedy. ~, Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); United States v. Gerlach 
Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). 
Appellants forewarn that since federal authority still 
grants a remedy of damages for unconstitutional takings, the 
effect of the Cal. S.Ct. decision will be to transfer all suits 
by aggrieved landowners to the federal courts where they may 
obtain the desired damages remedy. 
Appellants also argue that the alternative remedy of 
- - 6 - -
declaratory or mandamus relief is inadequate to give effective 
. - relief and thus denies due process. This result flows from the 
asserted ability of zoning authorities to thwart mandamus 
actions by delay tactics and to circumvent declaratory judgment 
actions by altering the challenged regulations during pendency 
of the suit. 
-
-·
Appellee counters that governmental action that effects a 
taking without compensation is unconstitutional and that this 
infirmity can be removed either by awarding compensation or by 
invalidating the governmental action, but there is no 
constitutional requirement that enforced compensation be the 
remedy. Appellee argues that the practice of the federal cases 
of awarding money damages rather than enjoining governmental 
action proceeds from an interpretation of legislative intent, 
not from a constitutional mandate. 
On the facts of this case, appellee defends the Cal. S.Ct. 
ruling that there was no taking because the limitation of land 
use to one family dwellings did not deprive it of sufficient 
value to violate the Constitution. 
DISCUSSION: The cases do not indicate that the Fifth 
Amendment requires a remedy of an action for inverse 
condemnation. That provision places a limitation on 
governmental power, which must be observed, and may be complied 
with either by the award of compensation or the invalidation of 
legislative action. The choice of remedies is one of 
discerning legislative intent. It is, of course, a question of -state law whether the Cal. S.Ct. correctly interpreted the ----intent of the state and local legislatures when it provided an 
exclusive remedy of declaratory and mandamus relief. 
I ' 
- - 7 -~ -
On the merits of the taking claim, the Cal. S.Ct. is well 
~- in line with precedent to rule that no taking has occured where 
previously undeveloped suburban land is limited to development 





Since appellants did not attempt to obtain administrative 
authorization to build, they cannot establish a complete taking 
of their property by claiming that had they applied for 
construction permits the same would have been denied for 
improper reasons. It must be presumed at this stage that the 
remedy of mandamus is sufficient to ensure that appellants will 
be able to realize the development allowed by the regulations. 
There is no reason to believe that in cases arising from 
Cal. zoning ordinances the federal courts will refuse to follow 
the rule of the Cal. S.Ct. that unconstitutional regulations 
are to be invalidated, rather than compensation be awarded. 
There should be no flood of such litigation in federal courts. 
The question whether the Fifth Amendment mandates a 
compensation remedy does not seem to have been definitively 
answered by existing precedent. A similar question was raised -- -----------
I in Webber v. City of Sacramento, No. 79-579, but the case was handled with a D&D at the Dec. 3 Conference. The question also 
is raised in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 
' 
No. 79-678 (Jan. 4, 1980 Conference). The posture of this case 
may be somewhat better than the San Diego case and presents an 
opportunity for the Court to make it clear whether optional 
remedies are available to cure Fifth Amendment violations. 
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm and two amicus 
briefs in support of appellants. 
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No. 79-602, Agins v. City of Tiburon lA--~. ~,L t,,f-
rt:.~---...C:/--6<-~,~• ~~4 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: ~~~ 
1) Did the actions of the City o~ ~ nP ,Toitur,.~ ~ - ~zoning regulations so diminish the value of appt's land  
constitute a taking? =~~~ 
2) Do the Fifth and Fourteent l *~~ents prohibit the 
California S. Ct. from holding that only injunctive relief -- not 
damages is available when state regulatory action deprives an 
owner of land of all its value and use? -•~---•n.
1 
~,i~.'1 ..d.J.LuN
1 2 . ~~ ,. r----- - -, , 
"-- ~~•L4 1 ~ ~ ~ L.vl 
a,4l«7-s~.-:=ti:- ~~f. ~ Jl/- JA.J ~~ 
In my view , t he facts of this c ~ se ... ~ rucial, and to some ""'--~ -~ ~ 
extent call into question whether the Court should have noted ~ 
~ ~ 
BACKGROUND: 
probable jurisdiction. Pet rs own five acres of vacant land on a 'ft.-It_. 
ridge in posh Tiburon, a peninsula from Marin County into San p.·l>/,t 
-Francisco Bay. When the events in this case began, the 1...§.!2.d was ~ 
zoned for one-acre residential development. In 1972, the City began 





t L ~ 
Agins' property for purchase as open space 
with money from a special bond issue. In 1973, the City 
promulgated a new zoning ordinance that, as applied to the Ag ins' 




on the five acres. According to the Calif. S. Ct., how ma~ 
~lT'1,,-' 
buildings will be permitted "will depend upon the particular 
I\ 
~rf Chite s.,_tur~ l design contemplated and the results of the required -
environmental 
never applied 
impact report." App. to Juris. St., at 3. Petrs have / 
to improve their land under this zoning o~qi~~nce. 
In October, 1973, the Agins' filed a claim with the City for 




of their land. 
1973, filed an 
Eleven months 
The City rejected 
eminent domain action 
later, however, the 
the claim, and in ~~.S 
against the Agin~ 
City abandoned that ~ 
 
effort, and in May, 1975, the city paid petrs $4,500 for their~-
expenses during the pendency of the eminent domain proceeding. In~ 
June, 1976, petr presented two claims against the city in state 
court: 1) a claim in inverse condemnation for $2 million in damages; 
2) a request for declaratory relief that the zoning ordinance 
achieved an unconstitutional taking. The city's demurrer to both 
claims was sustained, and the Calif. S. Ct. affirmed that decision. 
~~~-~e( 
DISCUSSION: ~~J My initial problem with this case focuses on whether there 
-was actually a taking.' The Agins' land is currently under use 
restrictions that are very similar -- if not identical -- to those \ 
that originally applied. Petrs argue that since their complaint 
- -
- 3. 
alleged the complete destruction of land values, and since the case 
went off on the pleadings, we must accept as true that assertion of 
no value. Yet, the Calif. S. Ct. squarely found that the under the 
current zoning ordinance -- of which it took judicial notice 
plaintiffs may build "between one and five residences on their 
property. This belies plaintiffs' claim that development of their 
land is forever prevented." 
certainly sounds correct to me. 
App. to Juris. St., at 13. That 
case. 
The issue then is whether that determination disposes of the 
The Calif. S. Ct. decided the damages question first, ruling 
that the Agins had no damages remedy. Then, it turned to the request 
.,I/ _, 
for injunctive relief and found no taking. I would be inclined to 
- reverse the order in which the issues are considered. I would first 
address whether there was arguably a taking, whether the plaintiffs 
had a cause of action. The City insists that the California court's 
interpretation of the zoning ordinance is binding on this Court as an 
interpretation of state law. Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 
426 U.S. 668, 674 (1976). This seems correct. If there is no 
taking, then there is no reason to reach the remedies issue. 
Because the Court presumably granted cert to decide the 
remedies question, it may well adopt the somewhat inverted approach 
of the state court. In the expectation of that outcome, I will 
address the remedies question. 
The Calif. S. Ct. offered only two (really one) reasons for 
~ - ------ ,,. 
- holding that an injunctive remedy was sufficient for a landowner 





wish local bodies to be creative and resourceful in zoning for the 
benefit of the community, we should not create monetary liability 
when the local government louses up. Such liability will only deter 
the full exercise of local powers. (This argument clearly parallels 
the justification behind immunity in §1983 actions.) 2) By imposing 
inverse condemnation remedies, the judiciary would usurp legislative 
functions by intruding on the budgetary process. This variant of the 
first reason simply recognizes the separation of powers implications 
of a damages remedy. 
Appellants attack this reasoning. They argue that the 
courts intrude more directly in the local decisionmaking process when 
they provide injunctive relief against a government program, rather 
- than simply provide compensation. Moreover, they ip sist tha t t he 
> 
practical effect of an injunction is to give the local governments a ~ -
second shot at zoning the poor landowner out of his property. (The ----- ........,__._._ -----. -WO appellants' brief is a bit strident; at one point, it likens the ~ 
legal position property owners in California in the 1980s to that of 
blacks in Mississippi in the early 1960s.) 
Two 1 ines of analysis occur to me. The first, and most 
obvious, is to focus on the requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Despite this Court's consistent whittling away at the 
just-compensation clause, it still requires that no property be taken 
by the government without the payment of just compensation. It has 
been recognized at least since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. · Mahon that -2_, 
- go~ernment regulation may be so overarching as to achieve a taking. 
Yet I think that the injunctive remedy satisfies the Constitutional 




no taking. Thus, the Calif. S. Ct. would seem on solid ground. 
Whether or not an injunctive or damage remedy is more or less 
intrusive on executive decisions is a decision that state courts 
should make according to their best judgment. It is not implicated 
in the Fifth Amendment issue in this case. 
There is the niggling questio 
j 1-~~ •. ,, .l,v 
··~..,- 6- -
restrictions on land ~ 




abolition by the courts. The California court found that that could 
not be a taking, and I suppose I agree. That temporary loss of value 
must be viewed as part of the price paid for belonging to organized 
society that attempts positive governmental action. 
A final series of thoughts centers on the practical features 
- of the case. Ideally, the sort of arrangement you want is one that 
permits the local government the freedom to choose between altering 
its land use regulation and actually acquiring the land. Some have 
suggested a sort of "contingent" action for inverse condemnation. If 
the landowner won the inverse condemnation suit, the municipality 
would be given a certain period of time to either initiate eminent 
domain proceedings or revise its regulations. Ellickson, Suburban 
Growth Controls: 
507-509 ( 1977). 
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 
That sort of flexible remedy certainly seems 
preferable. In an amicus brief, the SG insists that the Calif. S. -
Ct.'s decision will lead to that result. The SG argues that after a 
zoning ordinance is struck down, the town will have the choice of 
- filing appropriate condemnation proceedings, reenacting the ordinance 
with a compensation provision, or abandoning the regulation. 









SG fully appreciates the possible instransigence of a local 
government. In any event, I do not see how the Constitution mandates 
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May 23, 1980 
• 9' 
.:;;...• 
,• J .. ,_ 
l: 1•-.:.~-- ~= 
7 '<. ~ ... i,.. .. t· . ' ,;,. 1 • ;, ,- . " 
l i.:.._ .:'t 
i 79-602 Aqins v. Tiburon 
,. .. _.. I !o 1 -: _ 
.~ Ir-· ... ~~ ... 'I;: ., . . 
'· 
~- I have reviewed the Chambers Draft. Although I 
think we are fairly "close in" to a circulation draft, I 
;~i .::,_} .. ~ -, 
.. -- \ ~·, 
,,,_ . 
" ' ~,,...,,_ •.,"' ... 
continue to fJna this - as you have such a simple case that ,..,..l, ·~,, 
it is difficult to write. •·' .... .. J • 1' - :- ~..-. i ]:'-.,,. .., ~ 
A part of the difficulty is that almost every 
statement we make in Part II will become, or already is, a 
•r 
-.: 
;. .i~~-: ,_ . 
f1: .ll 
-..,:.,,. ... 
~ <_.~..., ~ .._! 
·f, 
"-.• 
.1:,~ ... _ .... {11, 
-t. •r part of this troublina area of the law. With this in mind, ,I-
. 
am inclined to make chanqes along the following lines: t~ 
.a-· .. 
1. Add a note defininq "inverse condemnation". I . ~ 
believe we defined it in the case from Alaska decided • J 
earlierthis Term. .. ,., ~ . ...___ 4· t ~ J Ji:"· . ' ' '"' 
~-, f 
·• ""'; ... 
~·ij J~ ~ 
,-
• . ,_-:·· .,t"' 
. .,t -
·'.';_,__ 
lJ;/t:,,'' • .. , . ,- ... -;, 




".:- .. :.:. ,1: ·"'! .... _;.._, ~ .;:._ \ 
"It held that landowners may not recover damages 
for land taken by a municipality." 1~ '',. , 
;, -~ ,.:~i-
~-~ 
Read literally, this would mean that if the city had acouired 
appellant's land through eminent domain proceedings, it would 
not have been obligated to pay any damaaes. Try reframing 
~ ,, 1!"-c .. 
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3. Note mv editina in penc!l on paqe 3. 
4. On page 4 the draft states that a zoninq 
"effects a takinq" if it "deprives a lancowner 
economic value", citing Penn Central.! This is a bit 
ambiquous. Read one way, it is clear that the landowner in 
Euclid was deprived of "significant economic value" when his 
property was devalued by 75%. The substance of what was 
in Penn Central, as I recall ~ was that there has been no 
Fifth Amendment takinq so lonq as the landowner is left 
siqnificant economic value. You miaht try reframinq it in 
' Indeed, this paraqraph in the opinion troubles 
~ood deal, perhaps became there never has been a 
formulation of any standard or rule. Also, I am not at all 
sure that deprivinq an owner of 75% of the value of his 
property, if this coula be proved (as distinquished 
mere allegation), is the sort of takinq that should be 
imposed on a sinqle unlucky individual rather than 
community as a whole. 
Do you think that Kajser-Aetna can be read as 
least tilting toward a more protective view than Euclio? 
What would you think of trying to work somethinq out 
the following ~ines: 
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indemnifies the property owner. The theory is that the ~ ~ 
. ', 
public or the community at larqe, rather than a sinqle owner, 
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the situation unaer a zoninq ordinance, the law provides 
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no precise rule or standard for determininq when the public 
generally rather than the affected individuals should hear 
such economic loss as mav be inflictea by such an ordinance. 
In the seminal decision of Villaqe of Euclid v. Ambler Co., 
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272 U.S. 365 (1926) it was held that there was no compensable 
takinq even thouqh the owner alleged that the land-use ..J<~~f·, ... .;_6.: .. ·.,; 
... ..- ~' .... 
restrictions would devalue one portion of his property by 
75%. Id., at 384. Despite this alleged diminution in value, 
the Court held that the zoninq ordinance was facially 
constitutional. In the recent case of Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S • 
164 (1979) (here, Jon, summarize briefly what we held in r~-
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Kaiser-Aetna which, as I recall, was a qood deal more t ·~,•,~)~ .... ·#'. • ... ~ 
sensitive to the interest of the affected property owner than 
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some of the earlier cases). Although our cases afford little 
quidance as to exactly where to draw the line, it is at least ,;j-. ,;-...... 
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involved. There are easy cases at either extreme of the 
spectrum. The diminution in value may ranqe from slight and 
speculative to great and permanent. -~·~t-t j s relevant, in some 
circumstances, whether the burden falls only on a limited 
number of property owners rather than a substantial area that 
may be rezoned in the public interests. This case, in its 
present posture, presents few of the difficulites that often 
attend claims of inverse condemnation." 
The foreqoina may try to state too much. I am dictatinq 
this. ~ I am sure that with your sharp pencil, you can do do 
better. l If lanquaae can be orawn from Kaiser-Aetna or other 
decisions, this miaht be helpful ejther in the text or in a 
5. Consider chanaina the last paraqraph 
paae 5 to read substantially as follows: 
"Even if it were shown that the market value of 
appellant's property was diminiehen by the zoning 
requlations, they were intended and designed, as 
the city council stated, to assure hiqh auality 
residential development. This purpose would 
benefit appellant as well as the public qenerally. 
Land use restrictions of this kina ensure orderly 
and careful development of a residential area, and 
the preservation of some open space land now 
recoqnized as important to such development. There 
is no indication that appellant's five-acre tract 
is the only propertv affected by the ordinances. 
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Appellants therefore will share with other owners 
the benefits and burdens of this exercise of the 

















6. The first sentence under Part III may require 
some elaboration. The California court, as I understand it, 






butrather a declaration that the ordinance in invalid, either 
on its face or as applied, amd enjoining its application. 
Although this has been made clear earlier, I think it would 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ,,'i . . ... t L n_")wall 
No. 79-602 Circulated: -•Y 2 7 19 80 
Donald W. Agins et ux., l t.ecirculated : 
Appellants, On Appeal from the Supreme 
v. Court of California, 
City of Tiburon. 
[June -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a municipal zoning 
ordinance took appellants' property without just compensa-
tion in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
After the appellants acquired five acres of unimproved land 
in the city of Tiburon, Cal., for residential development, 
the city was required by state law to prepare a general plan 
governing both land-use and the development of open-space 
land. Cal. Govt. Code § 65302 (a) & (e) (West Supp. 1979); 
see id., § 65563. In response, the city adopted two ordinances 
that modified existing zoning requirements. Tiburon, Cal., 
Ordinances Nos. 123 N. S. and 124 N. S. (June 28, 1973). 
The zoning ordinances placed the appellants' property in 
"RPD-1," a Residential Planned Development and Open 
Space Zone. RPD-1 property may be devoted to one-family 
dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space uses. Density 
restrictions permit the appellants to build between one and 
five single-family residences on their five-acre tract. The ap-
pellants never have sought approval for development of their --------
land under the zoning ordinances.
1 
, 1 Shortly after' it enacted the ordinances, the city began eminent domain 






AGINS v. TIBURON 
The appellants filed a two-part complaint against the city 
in State Superior Court. The first cause of action sought 
$2 million in damages for inverse condemnation.2 The second 
cause of action requested a declaration that the zoning ordi: 
nances were facially unconstitutional. The gravamen of both 
claims was the appellants' assertion that the city had taken 
their property without just compensation in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleged 
that land in Tiburon has greater value than any other subur., 
ban property in the State of California. App. 3. The ridge,., 
lands that appellants own "possess magnificant views of San 
Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas [and] have 
the highest market values of all lands" in Tiburon. Id. , at 4. 
Rezoning of the land "forever prevented [its] development for 
residential use . ... " Id. , at 5. Therefore, the appellants 
contended, the city had "completely destroyed the value of 
[appellants'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever . ... " 
Id. , at 7.3 
The city demurred, claiming that the complaint failed to 
state a c~use of action. The Superior Court sustained the 
demurrer, and the California Supreme Court affirmed. 24 
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979). The State Supreme Court ------
first cornsidered the inverse condemnation claim. It held tha1/ 
a landowner who cha.Henges the constitutionality of a zoning 
ordinance may not "sue in inverse condemnation and thereby 
city abandoned those proceedings, and its complaint was dismissed. The 
appellants were reimbursed for cc-sts incurred in connection with the action. 
2 Inverse condemnation should be distinguished from eminent domain. 
Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a government asserts 
its authority to condemn property. United States v. Clarke, - U. S. 
- , - (1980). Inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the 
m1nner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of 
his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." 
Id., at-. 
3 Tho appellants also contended that the city's aborted attempt to 
acquire the land through eminent domain had destroyed the use of the 
land during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. JAlO. 
l/ . FlJ 4 f !MA f .ty 1" 
J) 
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transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful 
ta.king for which compensation in eminent domain must be 
paid." Id., at 273, 598 P. 2d, atd:'P The sole remedies 
for such a taking, the court concluded, are mandamus and 
declaratory judgment. Turning therefore to the appellants' 
claim for declaratory relief, the California Supreme Court held 
that the zoning ordinances had not deprived the appellants 
of their property 1flhout compensation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.5 
We noted probable jurisdiction. 444 U. S. 1011 (1980). 
We now affirm the holding that the zoning ordinance on 
its face does not take the appellants' property without just 
compensation. 6 
4 The State Superior Court granted the appellants leave to amend the~ 
cause of action seeking a declaratory judgment, but the appellants did not 
avail themselves of that opportunity. 
5 The California Supreme Court also rejected appellants' argument that 
the institution and abandonment of eminent domain proceedings them-
selves constituted a taking. The court found that the city had acted 
reasonably and that general municipal planning decisions do not violate 
the Fifth Amendment. 
6 The appellants also contend that the state courts erred by sust&ining 
the demurrer despite their uncontroverted allegations that the zoning ordi-
nance would "forever prevent . .. development for residential use," App. 5, r 
and "col mpletely destro [y] the value of [appellant's] property for any 
purpcse or use whatsoever . . . ," id., at 7. The California Supreme Court 
compared the express terms of the zoning ordinances with the factual alle-
gations of the complaint. The terms of the ordinances permit construc-
tion of one to five residences on the appellants' five-acre tract. The court 
therefore rejected the contention that the ordinances prevented all use of 
the land. Under California practice, allegations in a complaint are taken 
to be true unless "contrary to law or to a fact of which a court may take 
judicial notice." Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 
105, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (1976); see Martinez v. Socoma Cos., Inc., 11 
Cal. 3d 394, 521 P. 2d 841, 844 (1974). California courts may take 
judicial notice of municipal ordinances. Cal. Evid. Code § 452 (b) (West 
1966). In this ca.se, the State Supreme Court merely rejected allegations 
inconsistent with the explicit terms of the ordinance under review. The 
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II 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property 
shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." The appellants' complaint framed the question as 
whether a zoning ordinance that prohibits all development of 
their land effects a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The California Supreme Court rejected the 
appellants' characterization of the issue by holding, as a mat-
ter of state law, that the terms of the challenged ordinance 
allow the appellants to construct between one and five resi-
dences on their property. The court did not consider whether 
the zoning ordinance would be unconstitutional if applied to 
prevent appellants from building five homes. Because the 
appellants have not submitted a plan for development of their 
property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete 
controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning pro-
visions. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 
588 (1972). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U. S. 996, 
997 (1979) (PowELL, J., concurring). Thus, the only ques-
tion properly before us is whether the mere enactment of the 
zoning ordinances constitutes a taking. 
The application of a genera.I zoning law to particular prop-
erty effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928) , or denies a owner 
economically viable use of his land, see Penn Central Transp. • 
Corp. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 138, n. 36 (1978). 
The determination that governmental a.ction constitutes a 
taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, 
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exer-
cise of state power in the public interest. Although no pre-
cise rule determines when property has been taken, see Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979) , the question 
law does not raise a federal question appropriate for review by this Court. 
See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,461 (1907). 
79-602-OPINION 
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necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests. 
The seminal decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 
U. S. 365 (1926), is illustrative. In that case, the landowner 
challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that 
restricted commercial development of his property. Despite 
alleged diminution in value of the owner's land, the Court 
held that the zoning laws were facially constitutional. They 
bore a substantial relationship to the public welfare, and their 
enactment inflicted no irreparable injury upon the landowner. 
Id. , at 395-397. 
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance 
legitimate governmental goals. The State of California has 
determined that the development of local open-space plans 
will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of 
open-space land to urban uses." Cal. Govt. Code § 65561 (b) 
(West. Supp. 1979).7 The specific zoning regulations at issue 
are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents 
of Tiburon from the ill-effects of urbanization.8 Such govern-
mental purposes long have been recognized as legitimate. See 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, at 129; 
Village of B elle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9 (1974); City 
of Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, at 394-395. 
The ordinances place appellants' land in a zone limited to 
single-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space 
7 The State also recognizes that the preservation of open space is neces-
sary "for the assurance of the continued availability of land for the pro-
duction of food and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recrea-
tion and for the use of natural resources ." Cal. Govt. Code § 65561 (a) 
(West. Supp. 1980); see Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 124 N. S. § 1 (f) 
and (h). 
8 The City Council of Tiburon fotmd that 
"[i]t is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space 
land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant 
adverse impacts, such as air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, 
destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and the environ-
ment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other demonstrated 
consequences of urban sprawl." Ordinance No. 124 N. S. § 1 (c). 
6 
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uses. Construction is not permitted until the builder sub-
mits a plan compatible with "adjoining patterns of develop-
ment and open space." Tiburon, Cal. , Ordinance No. 123 
N. S. § 2 (F). In passing upon a plan, the city also will con-
sider how well the proposed development would preserve the 
surrounding environment and whether the density of new con-
struction will be offset by adjoining open spa,ces. Ibid. The 
zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public 
by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly 
development of residential property with provision for open-
space areas. There is no indication that the appellants' 
five-acre tract is the only property affected by the ordinances. 
Appellants therefore will share with other owners the benefits 
and burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In 
assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinance, these benefits 
must be considered along with any dimunition in market 
value that the appellants might suffer. 
Although the ordinances limit development, they neither 
prevent the best use of appellants' land , see United States v. 
Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 262, and n. 7 ( 1946), nor extinguish a 
fundamental attribute of ownership, see Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U. S., at-. The appellants have alleged 
that they wish to develop the land for residential purposes, 
that the land is the most expensive suburban property in the 
State, and that the best possible use of the land is residential 
App. 3-4. The California Supreme Court has decided , as a 
matter of state law, that appellants may be permitted to build 
' ~wt?,;ircy- At this juncture, the appellants are free to pursue 
their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a de-
velopment plan to local officials. Thus, it cannot be said 
that the impact of general land-use regulations has denird 
appellants the "justice and fairness" guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. See Penn Central Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S., at 124.9 
£IJ >'l'ION1j.w 61~ 
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III 
7 
The Sta.te Supreme Court determined that the appellants 
could not recover damages for inverse condemnation even if 
the zoning ordinances constituted a taking. The court stated 
that only mandamus and declaratory judgment are remedies 
available to such a landowner. Because no taking has oc-
curred, we need not consider whether a State may limit the 
remedies available to a person whose land has been taken 
without just compensation. 
i:.l'he judgment of the Supreme Court of California is 
A/fimed/ 
stitute a taking. See nn. 1, 3, and 5, supra. The State Supreme Court 
correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's good-faith plan-
ning activities, which did not result in successful prosecution of an eminent 
domain claim, so burdened the appellants' enjoyment of their property as 
to constitute a taking. See also City of Walnut Creek v. L eadership 
Housing Systems, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 620-624, 140 Cal. Rptr. 690, 
695-697 (1977). Even if the appellants' ability to sell their property was 
limited during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appel-
lants were free to sell or develop their property when the proceedings 
ended. Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental 
decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are "incidents of ownership. 
They cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." 
Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 285 (1939). See Thomas W. 
Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F. 2d 784, 787 (CA8), cert. denied, 
- U.S. - (1979); Reservation Eleven Associates v. District of Colum-
bia, - U. S. App. D . C. -, 420 F. 2d 153, 157-158 (1969); Virgin 
Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F. Supp. 495, 498 (VI 1960); 2 
Nichols, Eminent Domain§ 6.13 [3] (3d ed. 1979). 
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No. 79-602 • 
Appellants, On Appeal 
I 
fro~1 t~e Supreme 
J)onald vV. Agins et ux., l 
v. Court of Cahfonua. 
City of Tiburon. 
[June -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
't The question in this case is whether a municipal zoning 
..... t . 
ordinance took appellants' property without just compensa• 
don in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
· After the appellants acquired five acres of unimproved land 
fo, the city of Tiburon, Cal., for residential development, 
the city was required by state law to prepare a general plar1 
g<;>verning both land-use and the development of open-space 
l~nd. C~l. Goyt. Code§ 65302 (a) & (e) (West Supp. 1979); 
see id., § 65563. In response, the city adopted two ordinances 
~hat modified existing zoning requirements. T1buron, Cal, 
Qrdinances Nos. 12i N. S. and 124 N. S. (June 28, 1973). 
The zoniug ordinances placed the appellants' property iii 
"RPD-1," a Residential Planned Development and Open 
Space Zone. R.PD-1 property may be devoted to one-family 
dwellings, accessory buildings, and' open-space uses. Density 
r1.1strictions perq1it th~ appellants to build between one and° 
fi~e. sfogle-famil'y residences on their five-acre tract. The ap-
pellants never have sough_t approval for development of their· 
land under the zoni11g ordinances:1 
_ ~ Shortly aftedt e11acted. the ordina1ices, the city began eri1inent domain 
J~oceeding-s ai~ins't tlie' iip1iellants' landi• The)fo!lbwihg yean, hchveve.t, tli.~ 
2 
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The appellants filed a two-part complaint against the city 
in State Superior Court. The first cause of action sought 
$2 million in damages for inverse condemnation.2 The second 
cause of action requested a declaration that the zoning ordi-
nances were facially unconstitutional. The gravamen of both 
claims was the appellants' assertion that the city had taken 
their property without just compensation in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleged 
_that land in Tiburon has greater value than any other subur-
ban property in the State of California. App. 3. The ridge-
1ands that appellants own "possess magnificant views of San 
Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas [and] have 
the highest market values of all lands" in Tiburon. Id., at 4. 
Rezoning of the land "forever prevented [its] development for 
residential use .... " Id., at 5. Therefore, the appellants 
contended, the city had "completely destroyed the value of 
[appellants'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever .... " 
Id. , at 7.3 
The city demurred. claiming that the complaint failed to 
state a ca.use of action. The Superior Court sustained the 
clemurrer,4 and the California Supreme Court affirmed. 24 
yal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979). The State Supreme Court 
first considered the inverse condemnation claim. It held that 
~ity abandoned those proceedings, and its complaint. was dismissed. The 
appellants were reimbursed for cc;;ts incurred in connection with the action. 
, . 2 Inverse condemnation ,;hould be distingui;;hed from eminent domain. 
Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a government asserts 
its authority to condemn property. United States v. Clarke, - U. S. 
-, - · (1980). Inverse condemnation is "a. shorthand de;;cription of the 
manner in which a landowner recovers ju:;t compensation for a taking of 
his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." 
ld., at-. 
3 The appellants also contended t.!1at, the city's aborted attempt to 
acquire the land through eminent domain had destroyed the use of the 
land during the pendency of the condermmtion proceedings. JA.10. 
4 The State Superior Court granted the appellants leave to amend the 
ca.use of action seeking a declaratory judgment, but the appellants dia n(lt 
&va.il themselves of that opportunity. 
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a landowner who challenges the constitutionality of a zoning 
ordinance may not "sue in inverse condemnation and thereby 
transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful 
taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be 
paid." Id., at 273, 598 P. 2d, at 28. The sole remedies 
for such a taking, the court concluded, are mandamus and 
declaratory judgment. Turning therefore to the appellants' 
claim for declaratory relief, the California Supreme Court held 
that the zoning ordinances had not deprived the appellants 
of their property without compensation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.5 
We noted probable jurisdiction. 444 U. S. 1011 (1980). 
We now affirm the holding that the zoning ordinance on 
its face does not take the appellants' property without just 
compensation.6 
5 The California Supreme Court also rejected appellants'· argument that 
the institution and abandonment of rminent domain proceedings t hem-
selves constituted· a, t~1 kii1g. The court found· that the city had acted 
reasonably and that general municipal planning deci;,;ions do not violate 
the Fifth Amendinent. 
6 The appellimts also contend that the state courts erred· by sustuining 
the demurrer despite their uncontroverted allegations that the zoning ordi-
nance would "forever prevent ... development for re;,;idential use," App. 5, 
and· "completely destro[y] the value of [appella,nt's] property for any 
purpose or use whatsoever ... ," id., at 7. The California Supreme Court 
compared the expres:; terms of the zoning ordinances with the factual alle-
gations of the complaiilt. The terms of the ordinances permit constnic-
tion of one to five residences on t-he appellant:;' five-acre t,ra.ct. The court 
tlierefore rejected the contention that the ordinance::1 prevented all use or 
the land. Under California practice, allegations in a complaint are taken 
to be true unless "contrary to law or to a fact of which a court may take 
ji1dicial notice."· Dal,e v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. AjJp. 3d 101, 
105, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (1976) ; see Martinez V. Socoma Cos., Inc., 11 
Cal. 3d 394, 521 P. 2d 841, 844 (1974) . California courts may take 
judicial notice of municipal ordinance:;. Cal. Evid. Code § 452 (b) (W~t 
1966). In this ca:;e, the SU1te Supreme Court mE>rely rejected allegations 
inconsistent with the explicit terms of the ordiiiance under review. The 
apJirllantl objection -i to the State Supreme( Court's ·aIJplicatfon1 of .'state,· 
4 
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II 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property 
shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." The appellants' complaint framed the question as 
whether a zoning ordinance that prohibits all development of 
their land effects a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Ca.Iifornia Supreme Court rejected the 
appellants' characterization of the issue by holding, as a mat-
ter of state law, that the terms of the challenged ordinance 
allow the appellants to construct between one and five resi-
dences on their property. The court did not consider whether 
the zoning ordinance would be unconstitutional if applied to 
prevent appellants from building five homes. Because the 
appellants have not submitted a plan for development of their 
property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete 
controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning pro-
visions. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 
588 (1972). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U. S. 996, 
997 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). Thus, the only ques-
tion properly before us is whether the mere enactment of the ' 
zoning ordinances constitutes a taking. 
The application of a general zoning law to particular prop-
erty effects a taking if the ordinance''does not BMbs~o.~ti 
..adua,Hee legitimate state interests, see N ectow v. City -of 
Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928), or denies a owner 
economically viable use of his land, see Penn Central Transp. 
Corp. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 138, n. 36 (1978) . 
The determination that governmental action constitutes a 
taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, 
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exer-
eise of state power in the public interest. Although no pre-
cise rule determines when property has been taken, see Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979) , the question 
law does not raise it federal question appropriate for review by tl1is Cou:irt, 
S~ Patterson v. Co.U,X,,-o.t.lo, 20~ U.S. 454,. 46.l (1901);. 
betJA d.. ouistdJ 
te f ~f,-(MS~ IF I) ta 
I} 
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necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests. 
The seminal decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 
U. S. 365 (1926), is illustrative. In that case, the landownel' 
challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that 
restrict.eel commercial development of his property. Despite 
alleged diminution in value of the owner's land, the Cou-rt 
held that the zoning laws were facially constitutional. They 
bore a substantial relationship to the public ·welfare, and their 
enactment inflicted no irreparable injury upon the landowner. 
ld., at 395--397. · r I {el ,,_!..kJ J 
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially ad,~ 
+1).tegitimate governmentai goals. The tate of California has 
determined that the development of local open-space plans 
will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of 
open-space land to urban uses." Cal. Govt. Code § 65561 (b) 
(West. Supp. 1979).7 The specific zoning regulations at issue 
are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents 
of Tiburon from the ill-effects of urbanization .8 Such govern-
mental purposes long have been recognized as legitimate. See 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, at 129; 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9 (1974); City 
of Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, at 394-395. 
The ordinances place appellants' land in a zone limited to 
single-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space 
7 The State also recognizes that the preservation of open space "is nec~-
sary "for the ai;surance of the continued ava ilability of land for the pro-
uuction of food and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recrea-
tion and for the use of natural resource::; ." Cal. Govt .. Code § 65561 (a) 
(Wc:,;t. Supp. 1980); see Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 124 N. S. § 1 (f) 
and (h) . 
8 The City Council of Tiburon found tliat 
"[i]t is in the public interPst to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space 
.. land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting aga.inst the resultant 
adverse impacts, such as iiir, noise and water pollution, traffic conge::;tion, 
"destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and the environ-
-ment , hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other demonstrated 
consequences of 1Ji'ban sprawL" Ordinance No. 124 N. S. § 1 (c). 
6 
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uses. Construction is not permitted until the builder sub-
mits a plan compatible with "adjoining patterns of develop-
ment and open space." Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 123 
N. S. § 2 (F). In passing upon a plan, the city aiso will con-
sider how well the proposed development would preserve the 
surrounding environment and whether the density of new con-
struction wiU be offset by adjoining open spaces. fbid. The 
zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public 
by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly 
development of residential property with provision for open-
space areas. ·There is no indication that the appellants' 
five-acre tract is the 011ly property affected by the ordinances. 
Appellants therefore wiU share with other owners the benefits 
and: burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In 
assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinance, these benefits 
must be considered along with any dimunition ·in market 
value that the appellants might suffer. 
Although the ordinances limit development, -they neither 
prevent the.best use of appellants'• land, see United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, -262, and n. 7 (1946) , nor extinguish a 
fundamental attribute of ownership, see Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, ·444 U. -S., at-. The appellants have alleged 
·that they wish to develop the land for residential purposes, 
that the land is the most expensive suburban property in the 
State, and that the best possible use of the land is residential 
2\pp. 3-4. The California Supreme Court has decided, as a 
matter of state law, that appellants may be permitted to build 
·as many as five houses on their five acres of prime residential 
property. At this juncture, the appellants are free to pursue 
their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a de-
velopment plan to local officials. Thus, it cannot be said 
that the impact of general land-use regulations has denied 
a1)pellants the "justice and fairness" guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. See Penn Central Transp. Co. 
v. New York City , 438 U. S. , at 124.0 
9 Appellants also cluim that the city 's pn,->eo11demnation activities con-
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III 
? 
The State Supreme Court determined that the appellants 
could not recover damages for inverse condemnation even if 
the zoning ordinances constituted a taking. The court stated 
that only mandamus and declaratory judgment are remedies 
available to such a landowner. Because no taking has oc-
curred, we need not consider whether a State may limit the 
remedies available to a person whose la1id has been taken 
without just compensation. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is .... ~ 
A1PJ!:2ed. 
1,titute a ta.king. See nn. 1, 3, and ·5, supm. The State Supreme Court 
correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's good-faith plan-
ning activities, which did not result in successful prosecution o:f an eminent 
domain claim, so burdened the appellants' enjoyment of their property as 
to constitute a. taking. See also City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership 
Housing Systems, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 620-624, 140 Cal. Rptr. 693, 
69&-697 (1977). Even if the appellant:;' ability to ,;ell their property was 
limited during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appel-
lants were free to sell or develop their property when the proceeding.s 
ended. Mere fluctuations 'in value during the ·proce,;s of g-overnmental 
dec.isionnmking, absent extraordinary dela.y, are "incidents of ownership. 
'They cannot be comsidered as a 'taking' in the con,;tih1tional sense." 
Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 285 (1939). See Thomas W. 
•Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F. 2d 784, 787 (CA8), cert. denied, 
- U. S. - (1979); Reserv(ltion Eleven Associates v. District of Colum-
bia, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 420 F. 2d 153, 157-158 (1969) ; Virgin 
1slands v. 50.05 Acres of La1ul, 185 F. Supp. 495, 498 (VI 1960); 2 
"Nichols, Eminent Doma'in § 6.13 [3] (3d ed. 1979). 
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Donald W. Agins et ux., l 
v. Court of California, 
City of Tiburon. 
[June -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowEJ.L delivered the opinion of the Court. 
't The question in this case is whether a municipal zoning 
~·· '. ordinance took appellants' property without just compens~ 
tion in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
· After the appellants acquired five acres of unimproved land 
in; the city of Tiburon, Cal., for residential development, 
the city was required by state law to prepare a general plan 
g9verning both land-use and the development of open-space 
11;1,nd. C?,l. Goyt. Code§ 65302 (a) & (e) (West Supp. 1979) ; 
see id., § 65563. In response, the city adopted two ordinances 
that modified existing zoning requirements. 1"iburon, Cat:, 
Qrdinances Nos. 12i N. S. and 124 N. S. (June 28, 1973). 
The zoning ordinances placed the appellants'· property ii1 
"RPD-1," a Residential Planned Development and Open 
Space Zone. R.PD-1 property may be devoted to one-family 
dwellings, accessory buildings, and· open-space uses. Density 
r~strictions penp.it th~ appellants to build between one and' 
fi~e. single-famil'y residences on their five-acre tract. The ap-
pellants neve.r have sough_t approval for development of the-it 
land under tlie zoni11g ordinances/ 
. . 
.. ~ Shortly aftedt eQacted. the ordina1ices, the city began eri1inent domain 
1Woceedings aihins't the' Jfo\ellants' land\· Theifollbwirig, y&n, hcfivevet, tlit 
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The appellants filed a two-part complaint against the city 
in State Superior Court. The first cause of action sought 
$2 million in damages for inverse condemnation.2 The second 
cause of action requested a declaration that the zoning ordi-
nances were facially unconstitutional. The gravamen of both 
claims was the appellants' assertion that the city had taken 
their property without just compensation in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleged 
.that land in Tiburon has greater value than any other subur-
ban property in the State of California. App. 3. The ridge-
lands that appellants own "possess magnificant views of San 
Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas [and] have 
the highest market values of all lands" in Tiburon. Id. , at 4. 
Rezoning of the land "forever prevented [its] development for 
residential use .... " Id., at 5. Therefore, the appellants 
contended, the city had "completely destroyed the value of 
[appellants'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever .. .. " 
Id. , at 7.3 
The city demurred, claiming that the complaint failed to 
sta.te a ca.use of action. The Superior Court sustained the 
d.emurrer,4 and the California Supreme Court affirmed. 24 
Qal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979). The State Supreme Court 
first considered the inverse condemnation claim. It held that 
~ity abandoned those proceedings, and it,; complaint, was dismissed. The 
appellants were reimbursed for ccsh; incurred in connection with the action. 
, . . 2 Inverse condemnation should be distingui;;hed from eminent domain. 
Eminent, domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a government. asserts 
its authority to condemn property. United States v. Clarke, - U. S. 
- , - (1980). Inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the 
manner in which a landcwner recovers just, compensation for a taking of 
his property when condemnation proceedings have not been im;tituted." 
ld., at-. 
3 The appellants also contended that the city':; aborted attempt to 
acquire the land through eminent domain had destroyed the use of the 
land during the pendency of the condemna.tion proceedings. JAlO. 
4 The State Superior Court. granted the appellants leave to amend the 
cause of action ;;eeking a declaratory judgment, but the appellants did 11(!t 
hail thewelves of that opportunity. · 
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a landowner who challenges the constitutionality of a zoning 
ordinance may not "sue in inverse condemnation and thereby 
transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful 
taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be 
paid." Id., at· 273, 598 P. 2d, at 28. The sole remedies 
for such a taking, the court concluded, are mandamus and 
declaratory judgment. Turning therefore to the appellants' 
claim for declaratory relief, the California Supreme Court held 
that the zoning ordinances had not deprived the appellants 
of their property without compensation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.5 
We noted probable jurisdiction. 444 U. S. 1011 (1980). 
We now affirm the holding that the zoning ordinance on 
its face does not take the appellants' property without just 
compensation.6 
5 The California Supreme Court also rejected appellants•· argument that 
the institution and abandonment of eminent domain proceedings t hem-
selves constituted· a t<1.kii1g. The court found' that the city had acted 
reasonably and that general municipal planning deci:;ions do not violate 
the Fifth Amendinent. 
6 The appellants also contend that. the stat"e courts erred · by sm;tHfojng 
the demurrer despite their uncontroverted allegations that the zoning ordi-
nance would "forever prevent ... development for re:;idential use," App. 5, 
and" "completely destro[y] tlie value of [appellant's] property for any 
purpose or use whatsoever ... ," id., at 7. The Californiit Supreme Court 
compared the express terms of the zoning ordinances with the factual alle-
gations of the complaii1t. The terms of the ordinances permit- co11Struc-
titm of one to five residences on t-he appellant:;' five-acre tract-. The court 
tlierefore rejected the contention that the ordinances prevented nil use or 
t-he land. Under California practice, allegations in a complaint are taken 
to be true unless "contrary to law or t·o a fact of which a court may take 
jt1dicial notice." · Dal,e v. City of Mo'Untain View, 55 Cal. AiJp. 3d 101, 
105, 127 C:-tl. Rptr. 520, 522 (197t:i) ; see Martinez v. Socoma Cos., hie., 11 
Cal. 3d :394, 521 P. 2d 841, 844 (1974) . California. courts may take 
ji.1dicial notice of municipal ordinance". Cal. Evicl. Code § 452 (b) (West 
1966) . In this ca~e, the State Supreme Court merely rejected allegations 
inconsistent, with the explicit terms of the ordinance under review. The 
app~lhmts' objection,,to the State Supremel Cciurt's -application 1 of .'state,· 
4 
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II 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property 
shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." The appellants' complaint framed the question as 
whether a zoning ordinance that prohibits all development of 
their land effects a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The California Supreme Court rejected the 
appellants' characterization of the issue by holding, as a mat-
ter of state law, that the terms of the challenged ordinance 
allow the appellants to construct between one and five resi-
dences on their property. The court did not consider whether 
the zoning ordinance would be unconstitutional if applied to 
prevent appellants from building five homes. Because the 
appellants have not submitted a plan for development of their 
property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete 
controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning pro-
visions. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 
588 ( 1972). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U. S. 996, 
997 (1979) (PowELL, J., concurring). Thus, the only ques-
tion properly before us is whether the mere enactment of the · 
zoning ordinances constitutes a ta.king. 
The application of a general zoning law to particular prop-
erty effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests, see N ectow v. City of 
Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928), or denies a mvner 
economically viable use of his land, see Penn Central Transp. 
Corp. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104. 138, n. 36 (1978) . 
The determination that governmental action constitutes a 
taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, 
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exer-
cise of state power in the public interest. Although no pre-
cise rule determines when property has been taken , see Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), the question 
law does not ra.ise a federal question appropriate for review by t liis Cotnrt. 
~ Patt~rson v. Co.DIXl,'O.tlo, ~5. U.S. 454,. 46.l (1901);. 
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necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests. 
The seminal decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Co. , 272 
U. S. 365 (1926) , is illustrative. In that case, the landownet 
challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that 
restricted commercial development of his property. Despite 
alleged diminution in value of the owner's land, the Court 
held that the zoning laws were facially constitutional. They 
bore a substantial relationship to the public welfare, and their 
enactment inflicted no irreparable injury upon the landowner. 
Id., at 395-397. 
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance 
legitimate governmental goals. The State of California has 
determined that the development of local open-space plans 
will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of 
open-space land to urban uses." Cal. Govt. Code § 65561 (b) 
(West. Supp. 1979).7 The specific zoning regulations at issue 
are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents 
of Tiburon from the ill-effects of urbanization.8 Such govern-
mental purposes long have been recognized as legitimate. See 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, at 129; 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9 (1974) ; City 
of Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, at 394-395. 
The ordinances place appellants' land in a zone limited to 
single-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space 
7 The Sta te also recognizes t.hat the preservation of open space is neces-
sary "for the assurance of the continued availabili ty of land for the pro-
duction of food and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recrea-
tion and for the use of natural resources ." Cal. Govt .. Code § 65561 (a) 
(We:;t. Supp. 1980) ; see Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 124 N. S. § 1 (f) 
and (h) . 
8 The City Council of Tiburon found tl1at 
"[i]t is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary converaion of open space 
··tand to strictly urban uses, thereb~r protecting against, the re1,ultant 
adverse impa.cts, such as air, noise and water pollut ion, t raffic conge:;tion, 
·destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and the environ-
· ment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other demonstrated 
conseq1,1ences of l)i'ban sprawl:'' Ordinance No. 124 N. S. § 1 (c) . 
6 
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uses. Construction is not permitted until the builder sub-
mits a plan compatible with "adjoining patterns of develop-
ment and open space." Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 123 
N. S. § 2 (F). In passing upon a plan. the city also will con-
sider how well the proposed development would preserve the 
surrounding environment and whether the density of new con-
struction wiU be offset by adjoining open spaces. fbid. The 
zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public 
by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly 
development of residential property with provision for open-
~pace areas. ·There is no indication that the appellants' 
five-acre tract is the olily property aff ectecl by the ordinances. 
Appellants therefore wiil share with other owners the benefits 
and· burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In 
assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinance, these benefits 
must be considered along with any dimunition ·in market 
value that the appellants might suffer. 
· Although the ordinances limit development, they neither 
prevent the.best use of appeUants'•land, see United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256,·262, and n. 7 (1946) , nor extinguish a 
fundamental attrlbute of ownership, see Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, "444 u.-s., at-. The appellants have alleged 
·that they wish to develop the land for residential purposes, 
that the la.nd is the most expensive suburban property in the 
State, ancl that the best possible use of the land is residential 
App. 3-4. The California Supreme Court has decided, as a 
matter of state law, that appellants may be permitted to build 
·as many as five houses on their five acres of prime residential 
property. At this juncture, the appellants are free to pursue 
their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a de-
velopment plan to local officials. Thus. it cannot be said 
tf1at the impact of general land-use regulations has denied 
appellants the "justice and fairness" guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. See Penn Central Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S., at 124.9 
9 Appellants al:,o clui.m thut the city's preco11demnation activities con-
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'l 
The State Supreme Court determined that the appellants 
could not recover damages for inverse condemnation even if 
the zoning ordinances constituted a taking. The court stated 
that only mandamus and declaratory judgment are remedies 
available to such a landowner. Because no taking has oc-
curred, we need not consider whether a State may limit the 
remedies available to a person whose land has been taken 
wit.bout just compensation. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is 
Affi,med. 
·~titute n. tu.king. See nn. l, 3, and -5, supi-a. The State Supreme Court 
correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's good-faith plan-
ning activities, which did not result in successful prosecution of an eminent 
domain claim, so burdened the appellants' enjoyment of their property .as 
to constitute a. taking. See also City of Walnut Creek v. Leadei-ship 
Housing Systems, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 620-624, 140 Cal. Rptr. 696, 
695-697 (1977). Even if the appellant:;' ability to :;ell their property was 
limited during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appel-
lants were free to sell or develop their property when the proceeding.s 
ended. Mere fluctuations 'in value during the ·proce:;s of g-overnmental 
deci~ionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, a.re "incidents of ownership . 
'They cannot be considered as a. 'taking' in the con:;tit11tional sense." 
Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 285 (1939). See Thomas W . 
•Garland, Inc. v. City of St. 'Louis, 596 F. 2d 784, 787 (CA8), cert. denied, 
- U.S. - (1979); Reservation Eleven Associates v. District of Colum-
bia, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 420 F. 2d 153, 157-158 (1969) ; Virgin 
Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F. Supp. 495, 498 (VI 1960) ; 2 
'Nichols, Eminent Doma:in § 6.13 [3] (3d ed. 1979). 
• • 
j,upuuu '40-urt o-f ut~ ~ niuh j,rnug 
:Jlagfrittgfon, ~. C!f. 21lffe'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEV E NS 
May 27, 1980 
Re: 79-602 - Agins v. City of Tiburon 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 




Suit by Landowners 
Scares Nature Lovers 
By Fred Barbash and Cynthia Gorney 
Washinston Post Staff Writers 
TIBURON, Calif. - The Tiburon ridge 
stretches out in a long golden curve, rocky 
and bright with wildflowers. To the east, one 
can· see small sailboats cutting fine white 
lines through the blue-gray stillness of San 
Francisco Bay. To tlle west, lit by the sun 
when the fog burns away, the Golden Gate 
Bridge spans the whitewater where the bay 
meets the Pacific. 
A fine setting for a house, thought Dcmald 
and Bonnie Agins when they bought five 
acres here in 1968-a dream house with a 
dream view. 
But it was also an environmental gem, not 
just a view but a "viewscape" as the plan-
ners would call it later, when they moved to 
preserve it from development. 
Now the property is the focus of a poten-
tially far-reaching showdown before the U.S. 
Supreme Court that has generated an ava-
lanche of legal briefs rivaled only by the 
abortion funding controversy. The showdown 
is between the environmental movement and 
a growing number of landowners and devel-
opers who consider themselves its victims. 
The briefs make clear both sides' belief 
that a decision in favor of the Agins could 
deal a devastating blow to environmental 
and land-use planning across the nation. And 
the case has become a vehicle for those who 
See TIBUR6.H, A5, Col. I 
By David Powers for The Washington Post 
Donald and Bonnie Agins own five acres overlooking- San Francisco Bay but dare not build. 
' ~---------------------------------
'l'Ht W \.SlllNCTOi'< PO~"!' ~undu;, June 8, 19811 ... it 
SupremeCourt Showdown Pits Landowners, Environmentalist 
TIBUftON, trorn Al 
ti"l)i for 8Utlh A dtl!l1iofi inti thOst 
Whl') Ital' {t, 
. Th• Aa1n8 h<iptii to lltll fOUl' •l.'rM 
;,r th.ttr rand tor ciofi11trullU@n ot fout· 
titUHII and \18t th• Jt'OijHl1A to tlnanol 
motr own home. 'rwtl\tl yttu l1t@r, 
lhe'l't ls l!tlll no MUH hAr•. 
· Attar th.t zon@t'IJ and pl1Mt1•1 .t111, 
t~li•4 Ullh: work, Uu l11mll)' would 
n1v1 ·n11d14 to 11ptn« thouaandA ol 
dollars on tnvlronmtntal im»allt 11m@, 
mtnts and mll!ttr plan8 l,ttotf th@y 
uould tvtn IPPl>' to b\lllct, Attd IP· 
l)i.'OVll would litUl 1\0( l,t I drtalnty. 
ltUtvln• tht proptrty worthltu tt1 
fl\lffl1 tl\t A1tn11 IIUOd tht citty of 'rt, 
lt11ron tor •• Jl\UHCJft Jn 11T5, Tiluron, 
ttiey lfl\ltd, tfUC!tlVtl~ took thtH· 
1and and 111houlcl JIY tor lt. · 
ro envlronmontaU~t" this wa~ tn 
,,uiu11oua proposltlun whloh they lc• 
11ur1ttly predicted would b• -thtown 
riut by the Califorttii court~. 
' 'l'hty did not, hOWl\tlt, exp•ct the 
~uprentl court to &acei,t th• ctl!I. 
~ow, as Utt tnvtrottntlntallsts tell h ; 
lht futurfl ol land us@ r@gul1tton is !t 
>itake, not tll mtntion 11\nidr0d$ of mil-
lions of dolltr~ ht cl1lms hy lindown-
~~-~ likl tht ArinB around ihl ct)Ul\h-y. 
tn tht p&~t !lttldt, ~tlltt tfter statf 
l\U frtlt!tttl J)l't)i!Uffl8 tl'1 pres~l"Vt 
Ot)b NPUll, 'l'hly survlvt oftly bftl&U!!f 
tht lll')Ul'i8 ltivt jtttttlllY litltl tl\at 
tht "publk goClt1 11-I pt'llty VllW, '-
park, l wlldll1t A.tea pr@littVltl=OVll' 
rid~ the htttl'@l!tm Uf indMdulll l111id-
0Wtt@1•~ ltt thft lffttJt@d ll:'ftld. 
lut 18 tht Mvirol\tttlliil1 ffltlVlltiffit 
l'IU gr1>w11, 1110 ha8 tltt d11~• uf U · 
al'ltvtct 111ndowr1@1·11, l\1at1y 11·• now de-
m111dlng C011\j}C!l\!!ltl011 for Wl\lt they 
btlttv• hl8 befttt tltkM ft't)tfl thtm In 
th• tUIme tlf tht publlc. 
1f th• landOWl\fll'I! Wll1 1 l!ltl1Hi' MU-
prem• Coµrt yktot·y in tnt AglH~ 
t11~1, envh:cmm•ntall11u. 8titt 111vtrft-
ffltl\t& lf\d tht tr.el, IIOVMl\fflDl\t llt't!t 
tlu1t ltlH'l \IH re1ulaH11n w!ll btt10ft'lt, 
lilt• ev•r~thlna thjt!, hm ell\,JAMlVI, . 
e1Utorn111, :fot' •umi,1t, n~8 1t 1,11~ 
,a50 mtlllon, worth tit' A111n11-typl 
cbltns it\ tht court~ tttlW, 'rhtH gth~1· 
dlims pe1\d At tM tJ,s: ~Ul,lt't!n\ 
Court, lwaiting a decl!!idl1 on revltw: 
• Sll\ Diefo Oll! 11td Ellecttlc to. l~ 
t·l11rnh1g $3.~ milliott nont the t1lHtH'-
11l1 city for t~~onlng tu ope11 sp•ce • 
propt!rty int11ttdtd :for.• powl\1· pllnt. 
• DflvtloJ;JUs in the state of Wash-
ill.gton 11'@ IIA@Jtmg C(JfuJ;)@listti(lll from 
tl\i aoverrtmeht of 'fhu1•stt1n County 
£01· blocking pll11~ to tleveto11 14 actes 
tlc:m; Lkltt LaWl'llnt:I in ord~t• ttl flt't· 
strvt t f@t!dlhg groufid for baltl l\l· 
gles, 
•• Girl Llllll al\d hl~ f10ttl)Y at'I dl-
nu1ndlng about $1 . mllllofi from San 
Juan e11unty, Wash,. ror &tldtng thelt-
property to i: "t6hliMVll1tY ifi\t!fttot·y'1 
ftlt 11r@li@tvatltlll ybt•~ tft!l' they ]jur-
thi!!M it 
'rhMt prtlte11ter8 tl\d Othets bMtl11t 
tltetrt hlVf g@l\ti'll.l1Y belltt tlrt tht 1os• 
irill 1dtlt ht tilt tlO\lrbL 'tht 1Jtth 
Amtttdm@nt to tht Col\stlhUltJn fl'll'0 
tHtl!i ih@ t11ttfi11 t1t pl'lv•t• pro1mty fot 
public Utie ",vHhoUt- jU~t llOlfll,len~tt-
tion." 'rl\t pl.'11bt1m tor Utt t1ndown-
e'rs h11s been the ttefinition of ! "tak-
ing." Over the years, most zoning and 
land use regulations have b~en upheld 
as something other than t taking-the 
extrcise of police pOWtt•~and thus r~· 
quirltta nu tiontpemiatlon. 
But th• SU}'Jt'~m• tout•t hat! nlVfl• 
directly confrontM the kind of com•. 
plicated multitied1d zoning and land 
usf pro,rtp,s enatitM by 1tat@8 1tt 1'e-
Uttt yfan. 
Th@ property owrttr11 belit\lt tl\at if 
fV@I: thort WU l Yt!lt fot· vhltt>ty, thl~ 
l~ lt, hi Dltlltftb@l'i th• ~Ut)rtlttl .Court 
' 
tul@d thlt tht U.S government had 
"taken" tht ptt>perty of l HllWail d@-
velop@ri KIUl!l@t' Aeb1it Cci., hy requir-
itt!I pub le tlltiMs to a mar1n11 on Ott1rn 
tl@V@ltlp@d on pl"iV!ti! ptoi;el'ty with 
pdvat@ £untie. 
Afid then, t month 111.tet, ill Art ac-
UOI\ UUtt !!Ut'ptH!@d il\tl pllhitketl · th@ 
Mvlrottttt@nhU ltiOV@ffl@ttt, th@ jUstlt\tl~ 
agt'@etl to review th@ A1,1in!l cast!. 
"Ytlu u@ rtuw @tttel'irtg Agms 
Acl'M, 11 !!ly!§ ~lftntl!!t. red-hatred Btlrt-
ni~ Agins, i s she opens her atft\~ ttl 
lh@ !!t)t!cta~uhtr p1U\tlflllhll al"tlUhd .h@r. 
"8e@ W!Utt w@'i-@ fighting tot'''" 
]fotthlt! anti 1)6fialc1 A!lit1!!, l dentist, 
!OUhd th@it" 'ribUl'Oft llnd 12 yl\at'!I lgtl, 
whet1 they d~cid@ti. thllt, with ' !iv@ 
children at home, they had outgrown 
their house in the nearby suburb of 
Lucas valiey, 
"We came up trtd lookM at the 
property and fell in love ,vlth it.". 
aunhle Agills !illtl ll8 ehl'l !itl on a 
flat 11ot.k: iJt the 1rtid1!t tlf - thf wild 
yellow gt'asses. . 
An architect had walked the open 
11mtl with th@ (!OUJ)ll'! , rhal)sOdl~lt1g 
tbuut its possibilltl@s1 111d the Agli1s 
MvisiOHM jU~t what th@y WllrttAd: ll 
Wtltld hou~@, tttllybf 1ml•r h~att!d, with 
lt1t1ti or gb.s~ to catch the vi@w!I, attd A 
swimming pool. 
1t WllS art expensiv@ p1•oject, but the 
Agins had decided how they \Vollltl 
pay for it. . "The attractive part of tl1is. 
property;" she said, "was . that . we 
cctu1c1 bUl1d tlur owtt house a11t1 sell 
Urn v•rt t1f the pttJperty that w~ dldll 'l 
want, lo l1!!1p fittartce out own house:' 
'They figured they wotikl sell four 
acres-one house. per' acre ... 
Zo11111g then p!!tttuth!tl Just such tlr-
\ E!loptnettt. The Agirts paid 150,000 f tl t 
th~ 1A11d !lhd held H fOt sevim1l years. 
t111til 'thes Mt l'l:'tttly l tl b!!gltl bUildlrtg. 
DUtlng th!! sahUl pet ltJtl , tnlltticlpnll -
tlei!! in Ctt1lfornia came uuder IJ. state 
ll!gis11ltivf tnatttlllte ttl beglh prescrv-
mg open Slltitle . 'the bMUty Of lht< 
state and its coastline was threatened 
by its population boom. 
The ctty r ai!!etl $1.2 million to bttY 
1:i rope1ty~i11eludil1g the Ag!tls'- along 
TibUl'Olt Ritlge in order to presstll'1·e 1 !._ 
fot' opeh space. Bul by the time thcv 
JiOt around to Aglhs Acres. th e mtmc~ 
was exhausted. The city then re-
zoned the Agins property to a C'Om-
letllly new category untlcl' a11 01·ui -
n1rnre dcslgnetl " lo ptolecl aml pl'e-
!!l'!l·ve opt:!11 space la11d as a lhnllctl allrl 
vlllllitble r t!soUtce.'' · 
'l'l1e 11ew ztllii!lg mlghl sllll allu11 
the Agins to build one to five uni 
on their five acres. But they estimate 
that it could cost uP to $50,000 111 re 
lo co11sullants a11d 1>ian11ers to asee 
the el'fecl 011 the view 811d on ll1 
fl ora and 'fatma of tile Tiburon l'lclg 
And to submit lhis costly impa 
statement wa~ no guarantee of a 
provaL 
The Agins ttever submitted a ,. 
quest tot thei1· 11tojet't. Afh!I' Ustenl 
to city officials and Ute ad vice of thl.! 
laWyl!t. thi!Y decid!!tl there Wall l 
c11a11ce of titJ!Jl'O\'al for the til'e houe 
thrv wantt!d to build. '' fl didn't see 
to ii-lake i\n~, sense to go thnlugh J1 
that If they told .vou a11!!atl of tit1 
yOll co1ildn 't." sald Doltald Agl11 s. 
•·r think when people want sOJ:n 
thing." he said, " they should be wi 
ing to pay ro,· it. They shouldn't r-
pecl yott to donate yoU1· l}l'op~l' 
whet! lh l:'Y \\·11t1l lo acquii'e ov 
_SpltCll. 
":\111., be the city sltuultl have ' 
shOl"ll:!11 u~ si!.(hts ll little bi t ll11d re 
Li t< lhcy catt ' t have c\ el'~·thittg ti\ 
wltnt lf the~· can 'l µ11 y for IL thet~'!i 
lol ot lhl11gs J \\' lll1t but Clllt't affo 
Th-at's Just the way It goes.;. ,, 
, !'!el' 'l'tuURON, AIJ, Oul. l 
- Uh-~ - ~~ ~, r3tUf I 
lfp/ss 6/9/80 79-6021_ Aqins v. 
This case is here on 
of California. The appellants 
of Tiburon 
from the Supreme Court 
acres/of scenically 
located land in Tiburon, California/ A' he Cityt°ned 
exclusively for single-family residences,; ~ ccessory 
I 
the land/ 
buildings,/ and open-space use. , 
I 
The appellants filed suit in state coury alleging 
that the zoning change/constituted a taking of their land ( 
without just compensation/ J n violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The appellants sought$ 2 million in 
I 
damages. 
The California Court held that, under the~~IJu.... 
ordinance, appellants could build between one and five 
residences on their property. But they had not filed an -
application with the cit/ requesting the right to build any 
residences. Although appellants argued that the practical 
effect of the ordinance/ was to inhibit a~~herf he use or 
sale of their property for residential purposes,/ the 
California Court disagreed. It held that there had been no 




We agree with the California Court on this issue. 
The case presents only a facial attack/on the zoning 
ordinance. As the ordinance has been construed to allow at 
least one residence, and possibly five, we hold there has 
been no taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2. 
A zoning law,/ enacted to further legitimate state 
interests, f oes not effect a taking/ so long as the property 
owner is not depriveaff an economically ~j able u~ e of his 
land. In this case, no showing has been made/ that this will 
result from the ordinance before us. 
I 
The California Court also hel3/ that even had there 
~ n a taking / appellants' remedy woula" have been injunctive 
relief / rather than a su~t for damages. In view of our 
rx.H...L.-~ ~J ~~-----~~ ~ . 
decision,~ we do -not :r'each ~ n. 
In sum, the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
California is affirmed by a unanimous Court. 
- • 
;§u:µttmt <lf lturl ttf tlrt ~tb ;§tatt.&' 
'!lfa,g~.~.<!f. 20ffe~~ 
C HAM B ERS O F 
.JusT1cE B Y RON R . wH1TE May 28, 1980 
Re: 79-602 - Agins v. City of Tiburon 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Mr . Justice Powell 





JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-- --
~nprmtt <!Jirurt it! tqt ~b ~tattg 
Jkudfhtgbt~ ,. QJ. 211ffe~;l 
May 28, 1980 ✓ 
RE: No. 79-602 Donald W. Agins et ux. v. City of Tiburon 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
~ 
- • $,uprtmt C!fou.rt of t1ft ~tb $,taus 
'llt~1t1fington. ~. C!f. 2llbi'!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JU S TIC E THU RGOOD MARSHALL 
,May 28 , 1980 
Re: No , · 79 ... 602 ·~· Ag;ins v. City of Tiburon 
Dear Lewis: 
Please j o i n me . 
Mr . Justice Powell 






May 29, 1980 
79-602 Aqins v. Tiburon 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your letter advisinq that my opinion 
satisfies you on the demurrer issue. 
I would prefer not to auote any particular language 
from Euclid. This Court has decided a host of zoning cases, 
and I thought it best not to auote selectively from them. I 
have, however, referrP.d to Euclid as the •seminal• decision 
and also have twice referred to page 395 of that case - where 
the language you like appears. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 




~u:prtmt <g:o-u:rt o-f tlt't ~nitth ~taug 
jJM!finghm. ~ . <g:. 2llffe'1' 
JU S TI CE W I LLIAM H . RE H NQU IST 
May 29, 1980 
Re: No. 79-602 Agins v. Tiburon 
Dear Lewis: 
My recollection of the vote at Conference is that 
Potter and I were the only ones who disagreed with the 
result which your opinion reaches, and that our feeling 
was based on the fact that the sustaining of a demurrer to 
a complaint which alleged that a zoning ordinance had 
completely destroyed the value of the plaintiffs' property 
must mean that the Superior Coµrt, affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of California, thought that this was permissible 
under the Eminent Domain Clause of the United States 
Consti~ution as applied to the states. Your treatment of 
the California practice in yotir presently circulating 
draft has convinced me, however, that California courts in 
passing on demurrers may take judicial notice of local 
ordinances, even though the ordinance as construed is 
contrary to the allegations in the complaint. I am 
therefore now quite prepared to go with you on that point. 
ram somewhat uneasy about the latitude which your I 
· treatment of federal constitutional review of local zoning I 
ordinances on pages 5 and 6 of your present draft appears 
to give federal courts. I realize that it is not easy to 
simply plug in a quotation to an opinion which you have 
already edited and structured in the manner that seems 
best to you, but my concerns along this line could be 
completely allayed if you could see fit to put in 
somewhere in the opinion the following quotation from what 
you describe as the "seminal" case of Euclid v. Ambler 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395: 
"If these reasons, thus summarized, do not 
demonstrate the wisdom or sound policy in all 
respects of those restrictions which we have 
indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, 
the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude 
r - • 
- 2 -
us from saying, as it must be said before 
the ordinance can be declared 
unconstitutional, that such provisions are 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having 
no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 
This may be just a difference of nuance, but it seems to 
me that it allows the states somewhat more latitude than 
your implicit requirement on page 5 that a zoning 
ordinance to be constitutional "substantially advance 
legitimate governmental goals". 
If you would prefer to leave the opinion as is, I will 
simply write a short separate concurrence, quoting the 
language from Euclid, joining at least in the judgment and 
probably in the opinion. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely ~ 
• • 
~nprtutt C!}ltltrl o-f tlft ~b ~buts 
Jl'MJrittghm. ~. C!}. 2llffeJ!.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Re: 79-602 - Agins v. Tiburon 
Dear Lewis: 
May 29, 1980 
Footnote 6 of your proposed op1n1on takes care 
of the basic problem I had with this case. Therefore, 
subject to being persuaded by whatever anybody else 






Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
- • ~ttp'rtnu <qomt 41f tqt ~tti:tt~ ~httt.s 
jbt.sqi:ngton. ~. C!f. 2llffe~$ 
CHAM BERS O F 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLAC K MUN 
Re : No . 79-602 - Agins v. Tiburon 
Dear L ewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Si;:!-
May 29, 1980 
/ 
- -.:§u.prtutt (Q:lturl ttf tlrt ~tb ~taitg 
jl'u!pnghm:. ,. (Q:. 2Il,;i~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
May 30, 1980 
Re: No. 79-602 Agins v. Tiburon 
Dear Lewis: 
The "nuance" which troubles me is probably not worth a 
separate concurring opinion in this case. I am 
sufficiently in agreement with both the reasoning and 
result that you may count me as a "join". 
Mr. Justice Powell 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -j;u.p:rnttt (!tltltrl ltf tqt 'Jlt.ttilth j;tltttg 
~agqinght~ to. (!t. 2llffe~.;l 
June 4, 1980 
RE: 79-602 - Agins v. Tiburon 
Dear Lewis: 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Powell 













-~ •·..-~-~ ................... 1__, ........ ~ 1,anoe-~gamoung:--casmos .. ~:=,ome or tne '."'.~;. ;:;;;; governmental ·action ipd;uc:aj~ casinos now in Nevada cou"!d conceivably 
petitioner to remain •silent't)eforearrest;: have found themselves in California had 
The fai lure to speak occurred before the the Justices accepted certain of Califor-
Jtitioner was taken into custody and nia's counter-arguments. Justice Bren-
given Miranda warnings. Consequently. nan's opinion described the efforts ·of a l 
. the fundamental unfairness present · in series of hapless surveyors, beset by such! 
.Doyle is not present in this case." difficulties as shifting river beds, to fix j 
_ In .dissent, Associate Justices Thur- the interstate border . . 
__ 71yj~ ~/ll-1/h 
:High Court Backs Zoning Cur_bs _ 
-Passed to Preserve,Environinent 
By LINDA GREENHOUSE 
Special to 1be New Yorl< Times 
. WASHINGTON. June 10-A zonirig or- Court's continued willingness-to look be-
dinance that limits development in the yond private property rights to the 
name of conservation does not neces- broader social policies that sometimes 
sarily violate the constitutional rights of require infringing on those rights. 
affected property owners; the _Suprewe Justice Powell said that while . the 
Court ruled unanimously today. · "mere enactment'• of the ordinances was 
· ·The Coun rej ected the argument of. a constitutional, the Court could not decide •· 
Califo rnia couole that environmental re- whether the restrictions had been uncon-
strictions placed on their five acres of va~ stitutionally applied . to the couple who· , 
,cant IaIJd overlooking San Fran<:isco Bay brought the suit. _ That was ~use the ·• 
.constituted a " taking" of the property couple, Bonnie and Donald Agins, ha& 
'~ithout the compensation req1;1ir:ed by the never actually applied for approval to de-
Fifth Arne..-idment . . _ ,. - · p,_ .,:·. , -,- velop the land. The ordinances allow up 
-< The Justices agreed with the California to five homes to be built on the five acres. 
Supreme Court that ,no unconstitutional with approval contingent on the environ-
" taking" had occurred when the City of mental impactoftheparticularplan. 
Tiburon enacted the open space zoning "At this juncture, appellants are free tQ-
ordinance i."'l 1973, five years after . the pursue their reasonable investment ex-
couple bought the land. pectations by submitting a development 
"The State of California . has deter- plan to local officials;• Justice , Powell 
- mined that the development of local open- said. . . . ' ,, - · ·' 
space plans will discour;ige !he ~rema- I Wide B~~fit Found 
tur~ and UMecessary conver:5100 ot open- . . .. . 1 . . space iand ro urban uses," Associate Jus- He said that the ordinances ~neftt 
.tice. Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote for the: the ~ppellants_ a~ w_ell as th~ pubhc _by. 
-Court. "The specific zoning regulations: serving the city s -mterest m assunn~ 
at issue are exercises of the city's .police care~ and orderlr develapr:nentof rest-
. power to protect the resident;; of Tiburon denttal proP;;°1Y witb.provtston for open. 
from the ill-effects of urbanization. Such space areas. . 
governmental purposes long have been The couple ,had ~ught $2 million in_. 
recognized as legitimate... damages from the city on a legal theory 
called inverse condemnation, arguing •· 
Ecviromnfltta1 G!'OUp9 lnYoJved that the city should reimburse them for 
The case, Agins v. City of Tiburon, No. rendering their property economi.cally 
79-602, attracted the attention of environ- useless. The California Supreme. Court 
mental groups, including the National held that damages were never available 
Audubon Society, the Sierra Club and the in such a case and that the most a sue-
National Wildlife Federation. They cessful plaintiff could achieve would be a 
argued as friends of the court that a rul- judicial declaration that the challenged 
ing in favor of the property owners would ordinance was invalid. ., .1 
jeopardize land-use regulation around The Aginses appealed this part of the 
the country. The_ Federal Government ruling as well, but Justice Powell said 
also entered the case on behalf of the city. that because the restric.tions did not in-
Justice Powell's opinion was narrowly volve a "taking," the Court had no occa-
written and did not resolve all the issues sion to decide the availability of inverse 
that had made the case such a focus of condemnation. 
concern. But coming a day after the The opinion therefore deferred to an-
·eourt rejected a shopping center owner's other day both the questions of damages 
argument that his property rights enti- and of the constitutionality of a rezoning 
tied him to ban petitioning on his prop- that gave the property owners virtually 
_erty, the opinion clearly signaled the no chance to use L'leir .and. 
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